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  I argue in this paper that it is important to develop a view of the integration process which, while 
recognising the dominant role of national governments and the importance of intergovernmental 
bargaining in this process, is also able to take into account the implications of "day to day" politics, 
and the crucial role played by  supra-national institutions and interests,  in influencing the choices 
made by national governments when taking decisions at the "history-making or "constitutional" level. 
Decisions concerning major institutional change in the European Union (EU) are taken unanimously 
by the governments of the member states of the EU. Ultimately, the choices made by national 
governments, and the outcome of the bargaining between national governments, determines the 
direction of the integration process. It is thus crucial to understand how member state governments 
choose between the alternatives available to them. 
 
Central to the argument developed in this paper is the thesis that an understanding of developments 
within the policy process may help us to understand how and why the dominant actors assumed 
particular negotiating positions on major "history-making" decisions.  Hence, events in the "normal" or  
"day to  day" politics of the EU may help to explain the process through which major institutional 
change takes place in the EU. The insights of the policy process, I argue, play an invaluable role in 
furthering our understanding of "the nature of the fundamental social actors, their preferences, and the 
constraints they face" (Moravcsik, 1993:477). The policies which emerge from the policy-making 
process, moreover, and the impact on the various actors of their participation in this process, may be 
critical factors in determining the role which national governments play and the positions which they 
adopt in the negotiations on the future of the EU. Thus, by altering the environment in which the 
dominant actors (member states) take critical "history-making" decisions, the activities of the 






  The central thesis of this paper is that, to understand the process of European integration, it is vital 
to understand the dynamics of the European policy process. Any theory which fails to take into account the impact of the policy environment, and of participation in the European Union (EU) policy 
process on the integration process, I argue, fails to fully encapsulate the process by which European 
integration has proceeded.  For a number of years scholars of European integration, having observed 
the apparent stagnation of the integration process and the consequent consignment of  neo-functionalist 
(Haas, 1958, Lindberg, 1963, Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970, Nye, 1968, Schmitter, 1970) and 
communication school (Deutsch, 1954, Deutsch et al, 1957) approaches to the theoretical wastelands, 
were, understandably, somewhat hesitant to generate 'grand theories' of European integration. However, 
during this period, from the early 1970s to the early 1980s (an era which Caparosa and Keeler (1995) 
have termed the 'doldrums period' for the development of European integration theory), detailed case-
studies of developments in the EU policy process proliferated. 
 
  In recent years, there has been a return of attempts to conceptualise the integration process on a 
grander scale and to reassess some of the insights of traditional integration theories (Moravcsik, 1991, 
1993, Sandholtz and Zysman, 1989, Sandholtz, 1993, Keohane and Hoffmann, 1991, Tranholm-
Mikkelsen, 1991, Burley and Mattli, 1993, Green, 1993). Critically, this theoretical effort is now 
accompanied by a growing literature examining the functioning of the EU as a system of governance. 
Drawing on approaches from the areas of comparative politics and policy analysis (Sbragia, 1992, 
Bulmer, 1994a, 1994b, Peters, 1992, 1995, Majone, 1993, Marks, 1992, Mazey and Richardson, 1993, 
Peterson, 1995) "increasingly scholars assume that some institutional structure is in place and examine 
what goes on inside these structures. Politics and policy-making within institutions have assumed an 
analytic place alongside the politics of institutional change" (Caporaso & Keeler, 1995: 43). The 
insights of these studies, I argue, may be crucial in facilitating the development of a more rounded   
understanding of the integration process. 
 
  It is increasingly recognised that it is important to focus, not simply on the process through which 
major institutional change takes place in the EU, but also on the 'day to day" functioning of the EU as a 
polity. Thus, Bulmer (1994:353) argues that  "analysing governance is not just a matter of the macro or 
trans-sectoral level. Rather, it is necessary also to take into account the policy or issue-specific level". 
This, of course, has important implications for our evaluation of the most appropriate "conceptual 
lenses" (Allison, 1971) through which to view these developments. Peterson (1995:71), for example, 
distinguishes between the different types of decision taken, the different actors which dominate and the 
different types of rationality which inform their actions, at the various levels of analysis identified 
within the EU, conceptualised as a multi-tiered system of governance. He concludes that no single 
theory can explain EU governance at all levels of analysis. Broad "macro" approaches to the issue of 
integration (such as neo-functionalism or state-centred "intergovernmentalist" approaches) are 
particularly useful for explaining the major "history-making" decisions of the EU. When it comes to 
explaining "policy setting" or "policy shaping" decisions, however, "macro-theories tend to lose their 
explanatory power" (Peterson, 1995:84). Indeed, as our understanding of the EU policy process, and of 
the process of European integration more generally, becomes more sophisticated, it may  increasingly 
be the case that "our explanatory goals are best served by specifying the analytic strengths - and 
limitations- of approaches that work better in combination than alone" (Sandholtz, 1993:39). 
 
  It is clearly useful to distinguish between different levels of analysis for analytic purposes. It is 
important, however, to remember that this divide is not clear cut. The relationship between the politics 
and processes which accompany "day to day" decision-making, as opposed to "constitutional" or 
"history-making" decisions, is, in many respects, reciprocal. From this perspective, the studies of the 
"normal politics" of the EU, identified by Caparosa and Keeler (1995:42),  might most usefully be 
viewed,   
not simply as ocurring alongside the development of integration theory but, rather, as performing a 
crucial role by enhancing existing understandings of the process of European integration and of the 
various influences upon the environment in which major "history-making" decisions are taken. 
 
  An important criticism levelled at early, neofunctionalist attempts to construct a theory of 
European integration is that they failed to specify a clear set of underlying asssumptions concerning 
the nature of the fundamental actors in the integration process, how their preferences are formed, and 
the constraints and opportunities which they face (Moravcsik, 1993:477). In contrast, in Moravcsik's (1993:474) work on liberal intergovernmentalism, clear core assumptions are specified: "state 
behaviour reflects the rational actions of governments constrained at home by domestic societal 
pressures and abroad by their strategic environment". The preferences of national governments, which 
determine their positions in international negotiations, are determined by domestic societal forces: "the 
identity of important societal groups, the nature of their interests and their relative influence on 
domestic policy" (Moravcsik, 1993:483). By distinguishing between "day to day" politics and 
"constitutional" politics, Moravcsik (1993:508-514) argues that while semi-autonomous supranational 
institutions do have an important (if tightly constrained) role to play at the "day to day" level, they do 
not have a significant impact on major "constitutional" developments in the integration process1. This 
level of decision-making is, he argues, dominated by governments which "are assumed to act 
purposively in the international arena, but on the basis of goals which are defined domestically"  
(Moravcsik, 1993:481).  
 
  In this paper I question the emphasis which liberal intergovernmentalism places on the distinction 
between "everday" politics and "constitutional" decisions. I argue that the insights generated from 
studies of the policy process present a number of important challenges to the underlying assumptions 
upon which liberal intergovernmentalism is based. First, as our understanding of the role played by EU 
institutions becomes increasingly sophisticated, questions are raised concerning the extent to which the   
fundamental actors in the integration process can be said to be operating in the context of "pure" as 
opposed to "bounded" rationality. Second, as the relationship between interest groups, both domestic 
and transnational, national governments and the EU institutions becomes more complex, it must be 
asked to what extent the process of national preference formation can be considered to be entirely 
exogenous or whether it should be recognised as an endogenous process. Perhaps, most importantly, 
questions arise concerning the extent to which activities in the "day to day" EU policy process may act 
as constraints or opportunities which impact upon the choices made by national governments when 
negotiating "history-making" decisions. In conclusion, I argue that a crucial insight of the early 
integration theories has largely been overlooked - namely, that in understanding the outcome of 
negotiations at the "constitutional" level of EU decision-making it is crucial to take into account the 
learning and adaptation processes which iterated contact between the various actors in the policy-
making process has made possible. 
 
 
2. Integration Theory and the Insights of the Policy Process 
 
 
  The increased understanding of the intricacies of the policy-process which has been generated by 
recent studies has been important in at least two major respects. First, in highlighting new questions to 
be addressed by integration theorists and exposing the shortcomings of existing explanatory 
approaches, and secondly, in addressing some of the commonly acknowledged explanatory failings of 
existing theories of integration. Critically, the details of the policy process may help analysts to address 
the recognised shortcomings in the macro-theories by, for example, justifying the various analysts' 
focus on particular actors, explaining the process of preference formation through empirical 
observation, examining the nature of the actors involved (to what extent may they be characterised as 
rational actors, for example?), and by identifying the relationship between the policy environment and 
the taking of major constitutional decisions. 
 
  Traditional theories of regional integration have, quite appropriately, been extensively   
criticised: sometimes they failed by their own standards (perhaps no school of integration scholars has, 
for example, been more self-critical than the neo-functionalists); sometimes they have been criticised 
for their choice of key actors or analytical focus; and sometimes, perhaps most importantly, they have 
been criticised for their failure to specify or justify the underlying assumptions on which their 
conceptualisations are based. Clearly, the analytical foci adopted by the neo-functionalist and the 
communications schools, for example, over-estimated the importance of day to day political processes 
and underestimated the persistent central role which national governments have played in the decision 
process. As early as 1966, for example, Hoffmann  questioned any notion of the potential obsolecence 
of the nation state. Evidence from both the EU policy process and from major Treaty negotiations has consistently reinforced the evidence of the critical role which national governments play in the 
integration process. In this context, the insights offered by theories of international relations, and 
developed and refined most recently by Moravcsik (1991, 1993) in his theory of liberal 
intergovernmentalism, that national governments are the dominant actors in the integration process and 
that bargaining between these relatively more or less powerful actors determines the final outcome on 
most decisions in the EU policy making and integration processes,  have been invaluable in developing 
our understanding of European integration. However, while the criticism of the early approaches is 
valid and appropriate, it is important to ensure that, in contemporary analyses of the integration process, 
the proverbial "baby" is not thrown out with the "bath water". 
 
  There may have been serious analytical problems with some of the early theoretical approaches. 
This does not mean that none of their insights were valid. Indeed, just as Haas (1970:607) noted of 
Deutsch's 1954 work on regional integration, "Deutsch raised all the major questions and introduced 
many of the concepts that still preoccupy and guide the research effort", the same might today be said 
of much of the work of the neo-functionalists. The underlying assumptions as to how and why 
institutions, interactions between the various interests and policy participants, the importance   
of the types of polices under negotiation, and the capacity of actors to adapt and learn, were important 
in the process of integration may not have been as clearly articulated by the early theorists as they 
would have desired, or may even have been founded on false premises. However, the policy literature 
has clearly demonstrated that many of these actors and processes do, nevertheless, have an important 
impact on the EU policy process. Perhaps the most important contribution of the recent upsurge in 
studies which employ the tools of comparative politics and policy analysis to the study of 
developments in the European Union, is the role it has played, not only in furthering our understanding 
of the functioning of the EU as a polity or system of governance, but also in extending our knowledge 
concerning the nature of the critical actors involved in the process of European integration, their 
motivations, strategies and goals. 
 
 
3. Institutions, Agency Slack and Purposeful Opportunism 
 
 
  One of the key insights to emerge from studies of the policy process is that "institutions matter". 
As a growing body of literature emerges on this issue, this has become less and less of a startling 
statement. A range of studies, which recognise the role of EU institutions in the integration process, 
has begun to emerge, both from authors favouring an intergovernmentalist perspective and from those 
who emphasise the central role of semi-autonomous supranational institutions. Institutions have been 
characterised in a number of ways: as passive structures; as actively shaping expectations and norms; 
and as "purposive"actors seeking to influence the development of the EU. Traditionally, analyses 
which  focus on the role of supranational institutions have been characterised as existing in direct 
conflict with analyses which adopt an intergovernmental focus. However, as current scholarship on the 
role of institutions becomes more sophisticated this can no longer be said to be the case (Moravcsik, 
1993:507). 
 
  The notion of institutions recognised as passive structures: as providing the norms, values and 
procedures, alterable only with unanimous consent, within which the day to day policy choices and 
major "constitutional" decisions are taken, is quite consistent with   
the intergovernmentalist perspective presented by Moravcsik (1993:509). The liberal 
intergovernmentalist approach, following international regime theory, emphasises the critical role 
played by EU institutions in providing a passive structure which enhances the efficiency of 
intergovernmental decision-making. By ensuring a shared negotiating forum; joint decision-procedures; 
a set of shared legal and political norms; institutions to monitor cooperation and defection; and, not 
least, by disseminating ideas and information, EU institutions provide a framework within which to 
negotiate major "history-making" decisions (Moravcsik, 1993:508). EU institutions may also, however, 
have a more active role to play. For example, while also emphasising the crucial role which national 
governments play in selecting between available alternatives when taking decisions in the EU, Garrettt 
and Weingast (1993) have argued that EU institutions play an important role in coordinating expectations and in shaping a "shared belief system". Analysing the role of institutions and ideas in EU 
policy-making, they have argued that "by embodying, selecting and publicising particular paths on 
which all actors are able to coordinate, institutions may provide a constructed focal point ". In this way, 
"institutions not only provide individuals with critical information about defection but also help to 
construct a shared belief system that defines for the community what actions constitute cooperation 
and defection"(Garrettt and Weingast, 1993:176). 
 
   Garrett and Weingast's (1993) emphasis on the development of a shared belief system is not 
inconsistent with recent studies which, drawing on the new, or historical, institutionalist perspectives 
(March and Olsen, 1989, Thelen and Steinmo, 1992), present institutions as more than simply "arenas 
within political action is played out" (Bulmer, 1994a:357) but as actively playing a role in shaping 
norms, values and conventions. Analysts applying the tools of new, or historical, institutionalism in the 
EU context have, however, gone further by stressing the dual role played by institutions (Bulmer, 1994, 
Peterson, 1995). Thus, institutions are also presented as playing an independent role as actors in the 
policy process: able to "develop their own agendas and act autonomously of allied interest groups" 
(Peterson, 1995:81) and perhaps most importantly: able to "generate endogenous institutional 
impetuses for policy change   
that go beyond the usual representation of institutional mediation" (Bulmer, 1994a:372). 
 
  The agency of the EU institutions is increasingly recognised, as studies reveal how EU institutions 
have influenced the agenda-setting, policy formulation and implementation processes. There is 
considerable evidence that institutions, as "purposive" actors, have an important role to play. Recent 
studies have highlighted: the role of bureaucratic politics in the EU (Peters, 1992); the role of the 
Commission as agenda-setter (Peters, 1994); and the Commission's role in the promotion of the EU 
regulatory regime (Majone, 1993, Cram, 1993, Bulmer, 1994).  Likewise, the role of the European 
Parliament as "conditional agenda-setter" has been examined (Tsebelis, 1994). Increasingly too, 
political scientists have begun to assess the important role played by the European Court of Justice 
(Weiler, 1991, Garrett, 1992, Shapiro, 1992, Burley and Mattli, 1993, Wincott, 1995a) and, 
importantly, to examine the critical interactions between the Court and other institutions within the 
policy process (Alter and Meunier-Atsahalia, 1994,Wincott, 1995b). Scholars have, meanwhile, been 
forced to recognise the complexity of the role played by EU institutions. Analysts have, for example, 
cautioned against over-generalisation concerning the role of "the Commission", which is a highly 
differentiated structure (Cram, 1994a), or of the impact of the European Parliament, as its influence 
varies between policy sectors (Judge et al, 1994). 
 
  Approaches which emphasises the "purposive" role of EU institutions are usually portrayed as 
representing a direct contrast to intergovernmentalist approaches as a result of their focus on the 
agency of these semi-autonomous actors . Indeed, this view is traditionally presented as being most 
consistent with the neo-functionalist emphasis on the role of the EU institutions and, in particular, with 
studies which focus on the role of the European Commission. However, Moravcsik (1993:508), in 
developing his liberal intergovernmnetalist framework, has explicitly recognised that, within the 
"everyday" process of legislation, administration and enforcement, the semi-autonomous EU 
institutions, to whom national governments have chosen to delegate certain powers, have a role to play. 
Moravcsik argues, however, that this role is strictly   
circumscribed by the national  governments and "is acceptable to member governments only insofar as 
it strengthens, rather than weakens, their control over domestic affairs, permitting them to attain goals 
otherwise unachievable" (Moravcsik, 1993:507). Institutional autonomy is permitted only to the extent 
that the advantages to national governments outweigh the political risk. Thus to emphasise the role 
which EU institutions play, for example, in the agenda-setting process is, from the perspective of 
liberal intergovernmentalism, simply to emphasise a role which governments, operating as self-
interested, rational, actors, have delegated to these institutions as a means of increasing the efficiency 
of collective decision-making and which may be curtailed if the political risk becomes too great. 
 
  Crucially, the current debate on the significance of EU institutions is not about whether or not they 
have a role to play. Rather, the debate is about whether the role played by EU institutions is simply that 
ascribed to them by the national governments of the EU member states, and strictly limited by these member states, or whether the EU institutions have developed their role beyond that predicted for them 
by the member states.  Moravcsik (1993:513) does, in fact, concede, that the decisions of one 
supranational institution, the European Court of Justice, have had a greater impact than many national 
governments either anticipated or desired. Here, I argue that the Court is not alone in enjoying some 
limited room for manouevrewithin the constraints placed upon it by the dominant role of national 
governments.  Moreover, I argue that is possible to develop a conceptualisation of the behaviour of the 
Commission as a "purposeful opportunist"2 which is largely compatible with the line of reasoning 
developed in the liberal intergovernmentalist approach to explain the relationship between national 
governments and the domestic interests which (largely) shape the preferences of those governments.  
 
  Within the framework of liberal intergovernmentalism, Moravcsik (1993:484 &488) allows for a 
degree of what he terms "agency slack". Thus, within the principal-agent relationship, in which societal 
principals delegate power to governmental agents,   
there is on occasion some limited discretion allowed to those agents. Where the interests of societal 
groups are ambiguous or divided, the constraints upon government are loosened: allowing politicians 
"a wider range of de facto choice in negotiating strategies and positions".  Here, I argue that just as 
national governments enjoy, under certain circumstance, some limited autonomy from domestic 
interests, so too the EU institutions have, under certain circumstances, been able to pursue a wider set 
of interests than those delegated to them by the member states. In figure 1, I have attempted to draw 
out the parallels between the behaviour of the Commission vis a vis the member states, which 
ultimately constrain its actions, and the behaviour of national governments vis a vis the domestic 
societal interests which, Moravcsik, argues, determine the actions of these governmental agents.  
 
Building upon, the work of Majone (1992a, 1993), which has emphasised the European Commission's 
ultimate goal of extending the scope of its competence, I have argued elsewhere that the European 
Commission, acting within the tight constraints placed upon it by national governments, has 
consistently enjoyed some limited autonomy from these governments (Cram, 1993, 1994a). 
Importantly, this approach while emphasising the crucial role which supranational institutions play, 
does not ignore the central role played by national governments. 
 
  The question remains, of course, is the impact of the supra-national institutions restricted to 
influencing events in the 'day to day" policy process or to those events which do not significantly 
impact upon the broader process of European integration? I argue that this is not the case. First, 
continuing to follow the line of reasoning developed by Moravscik (1993), national governments have 
not simply passively enjoyed the benefits of the occasional discretion allowed to them by divided or 
unclear domestic pressures, but have actively sought to maximise their room for manouevre. Thus, 
Moravcsik (1993) has argued, national governments have used EU institutions as part of a two-level 
game (cf Putnam, 1988) to increase the policy autonomy of national governments in relation to 
domestic interests: "particularly where domestic interests are weak or divided, EC institutions have 
been deliberately designed to assist national governments in overcoming domestic opposition" 
(Moravcsik, 1993:515). As Wincott (1995b) has pointed out this raises an important question: namely,  
in the absence of clearly defined domestic "demand" how are national government preferences formed? 
In the next section I argue that a crucial aspect of the preference formation of national governments has 
resulted from their participation along with other transnational interest groups and domestic interests in 
the EU policy process. I argue, further, that  the EU institutions, in particular the Commission (see 
Sandholtz & Zysman, 1989) but also the European Court (Alter & Meunier-Aitsahalia, 1994), have 
played a crucial role in drawing a range of interests into the policy process, thus influencing the 
constitution of policy-networks and epistemic communities (Haas, 1992) in the EU policy process and, 
ultimately, in influencing the "socialisation" of transnational and domestic interests (Sbragia, 1994).   
In this way, EU institutions have enjoyed a degree of active input into the preference formation of 
national governments (both directly and through the socialisation of domestic interests) and thus a 
degree of influence over the choices which national governments make in intergovernmental 
negotiations over "history-making" decisions. 
 
  Second, just as Moravcsik's (1993) approach allows for the potential of governments to maximise 
this degree of autonomy from domestic interests, by promoting ambiguity and the diffusion of entrenched domestic opposition, EU institutions have also sought to maximise their autonomy from the 
constraints placed upon them by the member states.  Thus, in section five, I argue that by promoting 
particular "types" of policy, the Commission has sought to minimise the likelihood of member states 
adopting entrenched positions in opposition to particular issues. In particular, by promoting the use of 
regulatory policy it has been possible for the Commission to disguise the "winners and losers" in 
particular policy debates. In this way significant progress may be made in policy areas to which 
national governments have traditionally opposed the development of an increased EU presence. While, 
the intention of national governments may have been to restrict the role of the EU institutions to 
activities in the "day to day" politics of the policy process, the implications of EU activities at this level 
may have far-reaching implications for the choices made by national governments at the 
"constitutional" level. The significance of this argument essentially hinges on its challenge to the 
notion of national governments as adopting negotiating positions and making choices on the basis of 
"pure" rationality. National governments do not always possess full or adequate information with 
which to accurately predict the impact of their actions. The Commission, for example, has often 
actively sought to package particular issues in such a way as to maximise the likelihood of their 
acceptance by national governments at the "history-making" level, while enhancing its own flexibility 
of action and room for manouevre at the level of the "day to day" policy process. 
 
4. Policy Participation, Socialisation and Preference Formation 
 
 
  In this section, the impact of participation in the policy process on the formation of   
national government preferences is examined. Recently, the major theoretical approach to have 
focussed our attention on the process of preference formation, and its impact on the integration process, 
is liberal intergovernmentalism. Moravcsik (1993) argues that the preferences, on the basis of which 
national governments bargain in intergovernmental negotiations, are ultimately derived from domestic 
pressure on these national governments. However,  as was highlighted above, the liberal 
intergovernmentalist framework, by allowing for a degree of autonomy for national governments from 
domestic interests, in itself, requires the development of a broader conception of preference formation. 
In this context, it is important to ask "what consequence does the process itself have for forming and 
reforming - perhaps for inventing or discovering interests and values?" (Lindblom, 1965: 15). As 
Sandholtz (1993:3) argues: 
   "membership in the EC has become part of the interest calculation for governments and societal 
groups. In other words, the national interests of EC states do not have independent existence; they are 
not formed in a vacuum and then brought to Brussels. Those interests are defined and redefined in an 
international and institutional context that includes the EC". 
  Here, it is argued, that the participation by national governments, domestic and transnational 
interests, in the EU policy process may have a critical impact on the preference formation of the actors 
involved and thus upon the formation of national government preferences. EU institutions, operating 
both as passive structures and as "purposive actors", may have the capacity to alter the very 
perceptions which national governments and domestic interests hold of their own interests. Thus 
participation in the "day to day" policy process may significantly influence the environment in which 
major "constitutional" decisions are taken in a number of important respects. 
 
  First, EU institutions, percieved as a structure within which major "history-making" decisions are 
taken, impact upon each member state's calculations of the risks and opportunities associated with the 
various choices available to them in intergovernmental   
negotiations. For example, it has been argued that, the existence of  EU institutions facilitated some 
degree of "preference-convergence" between national governments in the EU which, in turn,  allowed 
a degree of consensus to be achieved concerning the overall objectives of the Single Market 
programme (Keohane and Hoffman, 1991:23). 
  "The existence of a "regime" - in this case, the EC - though it did not provoke the new definition  
of French and British interests, affected these states' calculations of incentives and made it possible for 
them to see a policy of relaunching Europe as advantageous" (Keohane and Hoffman, 1991:25) 
   Iterated contact within the framework of the EU may, moreover, play an important role in 
encouraging the development of a set of "shared assumptions and expectations" (Vickers, 1965:15) 
amongst national governments. This, of course, would be consistent with Garret and Weingast's (1993) 
emphasis on the role of EU institutions in encouraging the development of a "shared belief system". 
Actors involved in EU decision-making, both at the level of "day to day" politics and of 
"constitutional" politics, are involved in an ongoing process of socialisation. National political and 
administrative elites, business elites and judicial elites have all had to learn to come to terms with the 
Community as an aspect of their daily lives:  "socializing new actors is therefore a central component 
of the Community-member state relationship" (Sbragia, 1994:75). There is increasing evidence of the 
mobilisation of transnational business elites at the EU level which have, in turn, pushed for further 
integration in the EU (Sandholtz & Zysman, 1989, Sandholtz, 1992, Green, 1993). The importance of 
the "socialisation" process or the development of "a sense of community" was, of course, a central 
tenet of Deutsch et al's (1957:36) work on the background conditions necessary for successful 
integration. While, this approach has long been out of favour, not least because the process of 
integration appeared to take place for the most part with very little involvement of the European 
citizenry, recent developments in the EU policy process might require a modest reassessment of the 
insights of this approach. For example, in the area of high technology the emergence of a community 
of individuals, who know and trust one another, has been highly   
significant for the development EU technology policy (Sharp, 1990). Recently, scholars have also 
begun to reevaluate the relationship between public support and the process of integration (Eichenberg 
and Dalton, 1993).  
 
  As the number of interests involved in the EU policy process has proliferated,  a growing literature 
has emerged examining the role of organised interests in the EU policy process (Greenwood, Grote & 
Ronit, 1992, McLaughlin et al, 1993, Mazey and Richardson, 1993). The policy network approach has, 
for example, been applied to the EU in an attempt to explain the complexities of interest involvement 
in the EU policy process, to describe the complicated interactions between policy-makers and Euro-
interests in the policy process, and to account for the evident sectoral variations in this process (see eg. 
Bomberg, 1994, Mazey and Richardson, 1993, Peterson, 1991, 1994, Dang-Nguyen et al, 1993). One 
crucial aspect of this work has been the recognition that pressure from organised interests has often 
been rather like "pushing against an open door" (Mazey and Richardson, 1993). 
 
  Crucially, the EU institutions have often played a critical role in bringing particular groups of 
interests together in the EU context and in creating policy networks. The Commission, in particular, 
may have an important role to play in providing the "catalyst for collective action", whether amongst 
member states (Sandholtz & Zysman, 1989), big business (Sandholtz, 1992a, 1992b, Green 1993) or 
amonst broader social interest groupings (Cram 1994 b). The Commission has, for example, frequently 
offered "selective incentives" (Olson, 1971) (ranging from funding opportunities to the opportunity to 
play a role in policy formulation) to encourage collective action. Likewise, the Commission plays an 
important part in initiating research and promoting particular sets of ideas which may encourage 
collective action amongst the various trans-national and domestic interests. Critically, "analysis and 
ideas are needed to discover opportunities of collective gains and to elicit support in favour of the most 
efficient way of exploiting such opportunities" (Majone, 1994: 5). An important aspect of the 
involvement of domestic and transnational interests in the EU policy   
process is the critical role which supranational institutions or political leaders at the supranational level 
have played in encouraging and promoting the mobilisation of these interests (see Sandholtz, 1992a, b 
&c, Green, 1993). More recently, the role of the Court in encouraging the mobilisation of individuals 
at the EU level has also been highlighted (Alter & Meunier-Aitsahalia, 1994). In this context, even if it 
is accepted that the involvement of domestic interest groups in transnational interest activity is 
primarily important as a result of its  impact via the "transmission belt" of domestic politics 
(Moravscik, 1993:483), it is significant that the preferences determined for national governments by 
domestic interests, on the basis of which, it is argued, negotiating positions are adopted in 
intergovernmental bargaining, may have been significantly influenced by the activities of the EU 
institutions acting, with a degree of relative autonomy, as "purposeful opportunists".  
 
 5. Maximising Institutional Autonomy: The Selection of Policy Types 
 
 
   “...day by day, drafting regulation after regulation, the Commission and its Eurocrats have been 
constructing a public policy foundation for the integration envisaged by those political acts. Likewise, 
their seemingly incremental and bureaucratic activities interpret and ramify the meanings of political 
actions and may at times push integration even further than intended (or would be possible) by the 
more politicized Council.” (Peters, 1992:87) 
 
  There is a clear conflict between, on the one hand, accounts which emphasise the importance of 
EU institutions and of the "day to day" politics of the European Union for the process of European 
integration, and, on the other hand, the intergovernmentalist position. The liberal intergovernmentalist 
view, while recognising the role played by the Commission, for example, in the area of agenda setting, 
maintains that the flexibility allowed to the Commission is strictly circumscribed and may be curtailed 
if member states view the political risk arising from the delegation of this task to the Commission as 
too great. Thus, Moravcsik  points out that while the Commission had already proposed   
many of the almost three hundred proposals which were to form the basis of Cockfield's White Paper,  
national governments had "simply rejected them" (Moravcsik, 1991:66). The Commission, viewed 
from this perspective is simply carrying out a task delegated to it as one of the neutral agents 
empowered "to propose, mediate, implement and interpret and enforce agreements" (Moravcsik, 
1993:509). Where the EU institutions are not tightly constrained, Moravcsik argues, their actions do 
not significantly affect the direction of the integration process: "In the intergovernmentalist view, the 
unique institutional structure of the EC is acceptable to member governments only insofar as it 
strengthens, rather than weakens, their control over domestic affairs, permitting them to attain goals 
otherwise unachievable" (Moravcsik, 1993:507). 
 
  Increasingly, scholars are challenging the distinction between events in the "day to day" policy 
process of the EU and the major "constitutional" decisions taken when, for example, new Treaties are 
negotiated. As noted above, the institutions of the EU have enjoyed a degree of discretion in pursuing 
their tasks. By making use of this limited degree of discretion, the EU institutions may also have an 
important impact upon the formation of preferences at the national and transnational level 
 and thus upon the negotiating positions adopted by member states. Majone (1994) has argued that 
"everyday" events and interactions in the policy process played an important role in "softening up" the 
environment into which Delors programme for "Completing the Internal Market" was 
launched:"Because of the work already done by the staff of the Commission and by other members of 
the European policy community, the programme for 'Completing the Internal Market' could be 
presented to the heads of government in the form of a white paper already on 14 June 1985 and was 
endorsed by them at Milan on the 28th and 29th of the same month"(Majone, 1994:11). Meanwhile, 
Wincott (1995b), for example, has emphasised the important role played by the interaction of the Court 
and the Commission in fashioning the innovative policy technique which made the intergovernmental 
decision to launch the 1992 project possible: namely, the strategy of 'mutual recognition'. 
 
  
  In evaluating the extent to which EU institutions have extended their reach beyond the confines of 
the day to day policy process, and have been able to influence the direction of the integration process, 
it is important to take into account the ability of the European Commission to propose the selection of 
particular policy types. By setting the basic parameters within which policies are implemented by 
national actors, the European Commission may have a significant impact, not only upon the 
implementation of specific EC legislation at the national or local level but, more importantly, upon the 
extent to which Community intervention in a particular policy area is considered to be acceptable by 
national governments. Critically, the presentation of issues to be decided upon by national 
governments and the selection of policy instruments proposed, is not a neutral task . The choice of 
policy instrument is highly political (Hood, 1983:136). The European Commission, I argue,  has not 
only made use of the limited autonomy allowed to it by national governments in this area but has 
actively sought to maximise this autonomy. By promoting the use of regulatory policies in the EU the Commission has presented sensitive issues, as far as possible, as matters affecting 'efficiency' rather 
than as issues with major 'distributional ' consequences. 
 
   A number of scholars have observed the emergence of what might be termed a regulatory regime 
in the EU (Majone 1992b, 1993, Peters, 1992, Bulmer, 1994). The advantages to the Commission of a 
regulatory approach are clear: in the absence of an expansionary budget, regulatory policy provides a 
cost-effective means of increasing the scope of the Commission's competence (Majone, 1993: 96). As 
regulatory policy plays an important role in "obscuring who wins and who loses in the policies" (Peters, 
1992:119), regulatory options are often the most acceptable to national governments. Thus, the 
promotion of regulatory policies, with their diverse outcomes which vary between countries, may play 
an important role in allowing the Commission to maximise its autonomy from national governments. 
By diminishing the likelihood of overt conflict and avoiding the development of entrenched 
negotiating positions, the conditions most conducive to the Commission's pursuit of its own objectives 
(see Figure 1) are created. 
  
 
   The Commission's role in the generation of ideas in the EU is commonly recognised. It is, 
important, however, to take into account the particular circumstances under which "ideas matter" and 
the extent to which the Commission has been able to facilitate the emergence of these conditions. 
Majone (1994:9) has argued that, "policy ideas and public deliberation matter most when public choice 
is about issues of efficiency - how to increase aggregate welfare - rather than about redistributing 
resources from on group of society to another". In this context, the ability of the Commission to 
disguise the redistributive impact of, for example, certain social interventions by promoting policy 
solutions which emphasise the "procedural" aspects of policy for achieving the most "efficient" 
outcome may be a crucial aspect of the Commission's ability to maximise its impact on the integration 
process via the generation of ideas. By disguising "the direction and magnitude of domestic policy 
adjustment" (Moravcsik (1993: 479), as the costs of regulatory policies fall largely on producers and 
individuals rather than on national governments, the use of regulatory policies makes it difficult for 
national governments to realistically assess the significance of policy coordination. Yet, crucially 
regulatory policies may have a significant impact upon the direction of domestic pressures on national 
governments. Thus, while regulatory policies may emerge from the "day to day" policy process, 
unopposed by national governments to whom they appear rather innocuous, they may, ultimately, have 




  Clearly, this perspective raises fundamental questions concerning the extent to which particular 
choices and decisions, made by national governments can be said to have been unaffected by the 
activities of the EU institutions in the policy process. The focus adopted by intergovernmentalist 
approaches, which emphasises the conflict between the potential winners and losers in the process of 
policy coordination (Moravcsik,   
1993:487), and hence those elements of major Treaty negotiations which have resulted in "lowest 
common denominator bargaining", underestimates the important role which EU institutions may play 
by packaging debates as concerned with issues of "efficiency", promoting regulatory solutions and thus, 
to some extent, blurring the stark divide between the winners and losers in major intergovernmental 
negotiations. From this perspective, the outcome of "day to day" politics in the EU may act as an 
important constraint upon the ability of national governments to take "rational" decisions, based on a 
clear understanding of national self-interest.  
 
 
6. Knowledge, Learning & Adaptation in the Policy Process 
 
 
  The argument developed above, has major implications for the way in which negotiations over 
major"history-making" decisions are interpreted and understood. Viewed from this perspective, for 
example, perhaps one of the more innovative developments in the Single European Act was to present issues concerning the, traditionally highly conflictual, social dimension of the EU as matters of 
procedure rather than of substance. Arguably one important reason for the relative lack of conflict over 
this issue during the SEA negotiations was the rather low profile approach adopted by the Commission 
and the focus it encouraged on procedural, rather than substantive issues. The Commission early on 
dropped its plans for major social reforms, focussing on "efficiency" issues rather than those which 
would draw attention to the "distributive" implications of policy innovations. Advances in the social 
dimension were extremely limited in the SEA, the provisions of Article 118A, for example, which 
allows for majority voting on matters of health and safety regulation for workers, were vague and 
likely to lead to interminable political controversy over their appropriate use (Rhodes, 1991, p.253). 
However, importantly this vagueness may have facilitated the agreement by member states on 
procedural reform in this area. Arguably, the focus on regulatory and efficiency issues, promoted by 
the Commission, allowed national governments to sign up to these proposals without fully 
understanding or anticipating the potential uses to which the procedures would be put . 
 
  
  The SEA was rapidly followed up with  a high-profile onslaught by the Commission on the social 
dimension. In a very short time, member states were to become aware of the implications of their 
actions. In particular, the UK government was so disturbed by the use made by the Commission of its 
new-found powers in the social area, that it chose not to sign up even to the non-binding Community 
Social Charter in 1989. The UK government feared that the social proposals, emanating from the 
associated Commission action programme, would be linked to Article 100a thus allowing for qualified 
majority voting in the Council (Rhodes, 1991, p.262). This fear was further exacerbated when the then 
Commissioner for Social Affairs, Vasso Papandreou, announced that the Commission would also use 
Article 118a as a basis for the implementation of the Action Programme wherever possible. 
 
  The approach advocated here, which emphasises the bounded rationality of the fundamental social 
actors in the integration process, which recognises the process of preference formation as endogenous, 
and which recognises the policies which emerge from the policy process as acting as forming 
constraints upon the ability of national governments to make, fully informed, self-interested 
calculations, requires the analyst to take into account the importance of events in the day to day policy 
process when attempting to explain the outcome of major "history-making" decisions. In this context, 
it may be important, to take into account the implications of the activities of the Commission in the 
"day to day" policy process, subsequent to the signing of the Single European Act, in interpreting the 
stance adopted by the UK government during the Maastricht negotiations which subsequently resulted 
in the UK "opt out" from the social dimension. 
 
  The social aspects of the Maastricht Treaty, from which the UK government has chosen to opt out, 
do not represent any startling substantive advances when compared with the ongoing activities of the 
EU in the social dimension. So what were the factors which caused the UK to take such a dramatic 
stance over the Treaty negotiations? The UK   
"opt out" from certain aspects of the social dimension during the Maastricht negotiations has been 
interpreted as the result of a  rational calculation of "self-interest" on the part of the UK government 
(Lange, 1993, 25-27). As Moravcsik (1993:504) argues, exclusion from the social policy provisions of 
the Treaty, limited as they are, was only likely to improve the competitive position of UK companies. 
However, viewed as a purely rational interest calculation, the same could have been said had the UK 
chosen to opt out from the social policy advances in the SEA. The question remains: what made 
Maastricht different? 
 
  One of the crucial insights of the early integration theorists which has often been overlooked is the 
importance of social learning in explaining the behaviour of actors (Haas, 1970:643). Here, I suggest 
that an important element in explaining the UK opt out from the social dimension, may have been a 
result of its learning from past "mistakes". Subject to the constraints of "bounded" rationality, the UK 
government when negotiating the SEA was unable to fully anticipate the implications of its actions in 
signing up to apparently minor reforms concerned with "efficiency" issues in the area of health and 
safety regulation. Presented, however, with the evidence of a flurry of legislative proposals based on 
this provision, which would ultimately extend its scope (Cram, 1993), and with a new action programme, which the Commission explicitly sought to base on the new provisions of the SEA, the 
UK government adopted a much firmer stance in the Maastricht negotiations. In this way, past learning, 
and an understanding of the impact of developments in the policy process, were used to minimise 
future uncertainties. Once again, however, the UK government, restricted by the constraints of 
available information,  has proved unable to predict the full consequences of its opt-out. Only one 
decision has, for example, been approved by the eleven under the opt-out procedure as the Commssion 
has proved reluctant to promote the use of the social agreement, preferring to proceed with agreement 
from all twelve governments.  Interestingly, however, the ability of the UK to opt-out from directive 
on European Works Councils (agreed under the opt-out) is increasingly being challenged as many 
multi-national companies are, anyway, introducing works councils in their UK   
branches. Once again, the UK government was clearly unable to anticipate the implications or 
consequences of the decision it took. 
 
  The interpretation of the UK opt out suggested here is important in two respects. First, it 
emphasises the importance of social learning and hence encourages us to view events in the policy 
process not only as constraining the actions of national governments but also as providing 
opportunities for learning and adaptation. Second, it recognises that the activities of the institutions 
may have an important impact, not only in facilitating the integrative process but also in creating 
disintegrative outcomes. Just as national governments act within the constraints of 'bounded" 
rationality, so too, the EU institutions are not always in possession of the full information required  to 
predict the consequences of their actions. Thus, while the low-profile approach adopted by the 
Commission may have facilitated the agreement of national governments on the, in retrospect, 
important procedural advances agreed in the SEA, so too, the high profile relaunch of the social 
dimension and the Commission's manipulation of the SEA provisions, may have contributed to the UK 
decision to "opt out" and, effectively, to the curtailment of the Commission's powers in this field. 
Although enhanced procedures have been provided for policy development amongst the remaining 
eleven signatories, that the Commission considers the opt-out, and the curtailment of the geographical 
scope of its competences,  as a negative development has been made clear: 
  "the Commission's principal objective is to promote the development of a European Social Policy 
which will benefit all citizens of the Union and will therefore enjoy, as far as is possible, the support of 
all member states. The Commission hopes, therefore, that Community social policy will once again be 
founded on a single legal basis. A major opportunity to achieve this will be the conference of 
representatives of Member State governments in 1996" (COM (93) 600: 9-10) 
 
  What the outcome of the IGC negotitions in 1996 will be remains to be seen.   
Certainly, the Commission appears to have learned a lesson from the UK opt out and has consciously 
adopted a low profile approach since the Maastricht negotiations. In the Commission's recent White 
Paper on Social Policy (COM (94) 333 final), for example, it explicitly states: "Given the solid base of 
European social legislation that has already been achieved, the Commission considers that there is not 
a need for a wide-ranging programme of new legislative proposals in the coming period". Meanwhile, 
by promoting an extensive consultation process, which has drawn a wide range of domestic and 
transnational actors into the various policy networks at the EU level (Cram, 1994b), the Commission is 
likely to have, at least, some influence on the domestic pressures to which the UK government will be 
subject during the IGC negotiations. Ultimately, in accounting for the position which will be adopted 
by the UK government at the 1996 IGC, it will be important to include an evaluation of the impact of 






  Clearly national governments play the dominant role in negotiating the future of the integration 
process. However, here I have argued that events in the "day to day" policy process have also had a 
crucial impact on the direction of the integration process. By altering the environment in which the 
dominant actors (member states) take critical "history-making" decisions, the activities of the institutions and other interests at the "day to day" level may also have had a major impact upon the 
integration process. 
 
  Insights from the study of the policy process have, moreover,  played an important role in 
furthering our understanding of "the nature of the fundamental social actors, their preferences, and the 
constraints they face" (Moravcsik, 1993:477). Thus, I have argued that the process of national 
preference formation is not exogenous but is fundamentally influenced by membership of the EU; that 
the actual policies which emerge from the "day to day" policy process, and the activities of the 
institutions in   
promoting and manipulating particular policy instruments, may act as constraints upon the abilities of 
governments to make rational calculations of self-interest when negotiating major "history-making" 
bargains and; that the fundamental social actors in the integration process operate within the 
constraints of "bounded rationality". 
 
  National governments simply do not always possess full or adequate information with which to 
accurately predict the impact of their actions. The EU institutions, however, also operate under similar 
constraints. In this context, it is argued, that the impact of past policy participation and the processes of 
learning and adaptation within the policy process are crucial weapons in the actors'  battle to minimise 
surprises. Thus, an understanding of the importance of policy learning and adaptation, in informing the 
actions of both the EU institutions and those of the member states, is crucial for any rounded 
explanation of the manner in which European integration has proceeded. 
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